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Mighty Good Thing: The Returns to Tenure
Alan Manning
Introduction
Since at least the work of Mincer (1958, 1974), earnings functions have been an essential part of
the toolbox of labour economists.  These earnings functions are typically cross-section regressions
of some measure of the wage or earnings on worker characteristics like age, job tenure, education
and training, sex and race (even beauty and sexual orientation) and employer characteristics (see
Polachek and Siebert, 1992, for a recent survey). 
There is an accepted way to interpret the observed returns to age and tenure in earnings
functions.  The returns to age are interpreted as returns to general human capital (net of any current
investment in this capital) (see Mincer, 1974, or Ben-Porath, 1967) while returns to job tenure are
interpreted as returns to firm-specific human capital.  So engrained are these attitudes that some
have claimed that the fact that wage profiles are flattened when a minimum wage is raised (see
Hashimoto, 1981) is evidence of the adverse effect of the minimum wage on training, a leap of the
imagination that seems somewhat too large.  But estimates of the returns to education, the extent
of discrimination and diagnoses of the causes of rises in wage inequality amongst many other
applications are all based on the conventional interpretations of earnings functions.  
This would not be a problem if there were no plausible alternative interpretations of the
empirical regularities found in earnings functions.  Unfortunately this is not the case.  Among  the
most prominent alternative hypothesis (and the one on which this paper will be based) is a model
based on search and job-shopping.   The more time one has spent searching for a job the more
likely it is that one has found a good one: hence average wages rise with experience.  And the
longer the time one has spent in a job, the more likely it is a good one: hence wages may rise with
tenure1. In this alternative view of the labour market it is job mobility that accounts for the wage
growth typically found in a working life (see, for example, Topel and Ward, 1992). 
Perhaps the strongest piece of evidence that there is something to the search story is from
studies of the earnings of displaced workers, those workers who have lost their jobs through plant
closure (which is taken to be involuntary on their part).  There are a number of studies of this type
(eg see Jacobson, LaLonde and Sullivan, 1993, for a survey).  As Jacobson, Lalonde and Sullivan
(1993, p.26) write, “much academic research on displacement has examined whether human
capital theory can account for the observed earnings reduction following dislocation”.  The main
way in which the human capital approach would try to explain the losses of earnings would be
through the loss of firm-specific human capital.  As the returns to specific human capital are
normally thought to be embodied in the estimated returns to job tenure, this means that we would
expect earnings losses to be associated to tenure on the previous job.  In addition, as the return to
labour market experience is generally thought to measure returns to general human capital, we
would not expect earnings losses to be systematically related to experience.  Another way of
expressing this is to say that if the human capital approach predicts that the residuals from earnings
equations for displaced workers are not systematically different from zero.  But, in general, they
are.  For example, Topel (1990) finds that earnings losses are also positively associated with
labour market experience.  There is a simple explanation for this.  There are two types of workers2 One might wonder about allowing the transition rates for the employed to also depend on other factors
eg job tenure and the position on the ladder.  While this would be a useful extension, the problem caused
by this is that the worker’s job mobility decision becomes much more complicated and we can no longer
assume that every worker will always prefer a job offer that is higher on the ladder as taking a new job sets
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with zero tenure in the labour market: those who have lost their previous job involuntarily and
have re-entered the labour market, and those who have voluntarily changed jobs.  It is hardly
surprising that there are differences in the labour market fortunes of the two groups but they are
traditionally lumped together in the estimation of earnings functions.  This is where a search
approach can potentially be helpful.  If part of the returns to experience and tenure are the result
of searching for good jobs then displaced workers are likely to lose some or all of these returns.
However, although this literature gives us some reason to believe in the importance of search
effects, it is likely that the traditional human capital approach also contains some element of truth
so that it is important to try to estimate the relative importance of the two views.
There is an existing literature that attempts to do this (Abraham and Farber, 1987; Marshall
and Zarkin, 1987; Topel, 1986, 1991; Altonji and Shakotko, 1987; Altonji and Williams, 1992,
1997).  These studies attempt to use panel data to separate the part of the returns to experience and
tenure (though the emphasis is commonly on the latter) that is the result of job-shopping.  Results
are mixed eg Topel (1986) claims to find no ‘true’ returns to tenure while, using a different
methodology, Topel (1991) finds large effects close to the cross-section estimates.  In this paper
we take a different approach to the same issue.  We show how information on labour market
transition rates and the wage distribution for labour market entrants can be used together with a
simple search model to derive predictions about the returns to experience and tenure in a ‘pure’
search model.  As these transition rates are observable we can then try to compare these
predictions with the reality.     
The structure of the paper is as follows. We start by deriving the implications of a pure
search model for the distribution of wages conditional on age and job tenure showing how the
predictions can be quantified using readily available information.  We then use British data to
compare these predictions with the reality.  Our main conclusion is that while there does appear
to be a substantial part of the returns to experience which cannot be explained by the search model,
this model appears to be able to the vast bulk of the returns to tenure.
  
1. The Returns to Age and Tenure in a Pure Search Model
We start with a simple search model in which workers try to work their way up a job ladder,
although we shall see that in order to derive much in the way of general theoretical results, we will
have to make some simplifying assumptions fairly quickly.
We will distinguish workers by their potential labour market experience which we shall
denote by a (though we will generally refer to potential experience simply as experience as is done
in most earnings functions) and their tenure which will be denoted by t.  Obviously we must have
t#a. We assume that individuals enter the labour market at experience 0 and they permanently exit
the labour market at a rate dr(a): this ‘death’ rate will have no effect on any of the results that
follow.  We also assume that workers leave employment for non-employment at a job destruction
rate du(a) that may also vary with experience.
Assume that non-employed individuals receive job offers at a rate ?u(a), and employed
workers at a rate ?e(a) so that the job offer arrival rate potentially depends on labour market
experience.2  We assume that all job offers can be uniquely characterised by their position on thetenure to zero which may then have consequences for future job opportunities.  With such a
generalization one also has to introduce the wage function at an earlier stage to determine the optimal
mobility decision. 
3 In what follows we will write as if the ‘true’ return to experience is explained by returns to human capital
as is the traditional explanation.  But it is important to note that nothing in what follows is a test of this
hypothesis and there are other possible reasons for why wage offers might depend on experience.
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job ladder F which must, by construction, be distributed uniformly on the unit interval.  We assume
that jobs do not change their position in the wage hierarchy over time.  Non-employed workers are
assumed to accept all job offers, though employed workers only accept job offers that are at a
higher position on the ladder so that the rate at which workers of experience a currently employed
at a firm at position F on the job ladder quit to other firms is given by ?e(a)(1-F).  It is this on-the-
job search and the job mobility it implies that means that the distribution of workers will not be
uniform on the job ladder: it is important to be clear about this distinction between the distribution
of job offers and the distribution of wages across workers. 
At this point it is worth considering which wage policies are consistent with this behaviour
of workers.  It is consistent with a wage policy of the form w(F,a) so that there could be a ‘true’
effect of experience on wages.3  The reason is simple: if wages in all firms rise with experience
but firms do not change their position on the job ladder then the relative attractiveness of working
in this firm will not change over time.  One special case we shall pay particular attention to is
where the log wages offered by firms are of the separable form w(F,a)=w(F)+f (a).  But it should
be equally obvious that the search behaviour of workers described above is not consistent with
‘true’ returns to tenure ie wage policies of the form w(F,a,t).  There are two reasons for this.  First,
if wages rise with job tenure within firms then, though the firm will be at position F in the wage
offer distribution at entry for a worker with tenure t, it is now effectively at a higher position as
their wage has risen.  In this case the firm will be effectively at position T(F,a,t) in the wage offer
distribution which must satisfy w(F,a,t)=w(T(F,a,t),a,0) and it is this ‘adjusted’ position which
will determine the job mobility of workers.  In this case we cannot derive the workers’ mobility
decision without knowledge of the form of the wage offer distribution, a problem that does not
arise when the ‘true’ returns to tenure are zero.  The second problem occurs if returns to tenure are
non-linear.  Then the rate of wage growth will differ across jobs and workers would be expected
to take account of this as well as the current level of wages in making their job mobility decisions
(see Topel, 1986, for an elaboration of this point).
While these are not insurmountable problems (see Hartog and Teulings, 1996, for the
working out of one special case) it does make life more difficult, so we work here with a
benchmark assumption of no true returns to job tenure.  How adequate is this assumption is one of
the main topics of this paper.
Let us start with some notation.  Normalise the size of the labour force of experience zero
to 1 and denote by u(a) the number of non-employed workers of experience a.    Let us denote by
N(F,a) the number of workers employed at position F or lower on the job ladder of experience a
(for employment we use upper case letters to denote cumulative densities and lower case to denote
densities). For the dynamics of non-employment we must have:
which simply says that the change in the level of non-employment is the difference between4
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inflows and outflows.  Now consider the equation for the dynamics of N(F,a).  We must have:
which again says that the change in the stock is equal to the inflow (which can only come from non-
employment) minus the outflow.  To solve these differential equations one needs initial conditions
specifying the non-employment rate u(0) among labour market entrants, and the distribution of new
entrants on the job ladder.  For the latter condition it is most natural to assume that as these people
have had time to receive at most one job offer they are distributed uniformly on the job ladder so
that N(F,0)=[1-u(0)]F.
We can simplify the framework somewhat by noticing that the ‘death’ rate plays no role
in the distribution of workers on the job ladder or on the non-employment rate.  One can see this
by replacing u(a) in every equation by:
and N(F,a) in every equation by:
Effectively these transformations convert from levels to rates.  After this transformation the
equations (1)-(2) no longer contain the death rate so that the expressions for the distribution of
workers on the job ladder also do not depend on the death rate.  The reason for this is obvious:
as the death rate is independent of employment status and position on the job ladder (assumptions
which might of course be questioned in reality) the death rate simply determines the size of a
particular age group and not the distribution across labour market states.  Given this irrelevance
of the death rate we will work from now on with the formulae in (1)-(3) with the death rate set
equal to zero: this is without loss of generality.
The set-up so far is exactly the same as in Manning (1996) where the focus was on the
distribution of wages conditional on experience.  Here we generalise this by looking at the
distribution of wages jointly conditional on experience and job tenure.  So, let us consider how
we can derive this distribution.  Let us denote by n(F,a,t) the density of workers at position F on
the job ladder of current experience a and job tenure t.  What we know about these people is that
they must have entered the job at experience (a-t) and neither been laid-off nor received a better
job offer since.  Hence we must have:
where R(F,a-t,0) is the density of new recruits at experience level (a-t).  These new recruits must
come from one of two states: from non-employment and from those employed at a lower point than4 Unless (1-u(0))=1 this means there is a discontinuity at a=t for the reason that those in starting jobs at
experience zero have just been placed there randomly, while those starting jobs at any experience level
strictly greater than zero are systematically selected in some way.
5 One exception is if all workers are initially in employment, there are never any quits to unemployment,
the initial wage distribution has an extreme value distribution and job offers are exponentially distributed
(see Hartog and Teulings, 1996).  Then the wage distribution conditional on age and tenure has an extreme
value distribution.  But a lot of special assumptions are needed to get this result.
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F in the job ladder.  Hence we have:
for a>t. For a=t, matters are rather different as R(F,0,0)=(1-u(0)).4   Given the solution for u(a) and
N(F,a) derived earlier we can obviously use (5) and (6) to solve for n(F,a,t).  Given a solution
n(F,a,t) it is simple to work out the distribution of workers on the job ladder given experience and
job tenure.  Define G(F*a,t) to be the fraction of workers at position F or below given experience
and tenure.  This is given by:
Let us now consider the predictions of this model for the relationship between the wage
distribution, experience and tenure.  For a discussion of the prediction of this model for the
relationship between earnings and experience alone see Manning (1996).
In the general case, it does not seem possible to provide a convenient closed-form
analytical expression for the conditional distribution function in which we are interested.5
However, the following proposition shows that this does not prevent us from examining the effect
of age and tenure on expected wages.
Proposition 1: If dln(n)/dx is increasing (resp. decreasing) in F then the distribution G(F*a,t) is
increasing in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance (resp. decreasing) in variable x.
Proof: See Appendix.
To consider the impact of experience and tenure on the wage distribution let us combine (5) and
(6) to yield:6 This reasoning also suggests when this result might fail.  Suppose there is individual heterogeneity in ?e.
The long tenure individuals will then tend to be those with low job-to-job mobility rates who will tend to
be concentrated down the bottom end of the job ladder.  So, one should not conclude that one cannot
construct labour market models in which this result on may be violated.
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Let us start with the most general easy result to prove.  Notice that we can simplify (8) somewhat
if we look at the distribution of wages conditional not on current experience and job tenure but on
experience at the start of the current job (a-t) and job tenure.  Let us define a0 to be starting
experience and use the function n0(F,a0,t) to denote the density of workers at position f given
starting experience and tenure.  We must have:
This way of writing things shows that, conditional on starting experience, job tenure affects the
distribution of workers on the job ladder solely through the effect on the proportion remaining after
a certain period of time.  As the following proposition says we can sign this.
Proposition 2: Conditional on starting experience the wage distribution is increasing in job tenure.
Proof: Simple differentiation of (9) leads to:
so that simple application of Proposition 1 gives us the result we want.  
The intuition is straightforward.  Among workers who start jobs at the same experience
level the ones who survive a longer period of time are the ones with the low separation rates
(which are the workers with the better paid jobs) so that among workers with long job tenure we
would expect to find disproportionate numbers of workers towards the top of the job ladder.6
Given that the effects of job tenure on the wage distribution are unambiguous let us now
turn to the effect of starting experience.  As will become apparent, matters are not so clear-cut here
and the effect is ambiguous.  To try to make this clear let us concentrate on the particularly  simple
case where the transition rates are independent of experience, non-employment rates are constant
and ?e=?u.  Manning (1996) shows that these assumptions are sufficient for the distribution of7 Of course, one would like to have the data on where the workers came from but, in most data sets, this
is not available.
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wages conditional on experience alone to be increasing in experience.  But, as we shall see,
including job tenure as an extra conditioning variable means that even this result no longer holds.
Proposition 3: Even if non-employment rates are constant, transition rates are constant and job
offer arrival rates independent of labour market state, it is possible that expected wages,
conditional on job tenure and experience are declining in experience.
Proof: See Appendix
Proposition 3 is worded in a somewhat curious way because it is never true that rising experience
leads to a worse distribution in the sense of first-order stochastic dominance but it can get worse
at some points in the distribution.  To understand the reason for this, suppose we observe two sets
of workers with different experiences but with identical job tenure.  We can divide each of these
sets of workers into two groups:
I. those that arrived in the present job directly from another job
II. those that arrived in the present job from unemployment
The distribution of wages among these two groups will be different but, if we condition only on
experience and tenure, the observed wage distribution will be a mixture of the two.7  As the wage
distribution shifts up with experience (the result in Manning, 1996) the wage distribution must be
higher for an older worker from group I than for a younger worker.  In contrast the wage
distribution among those from group II must be independent of experience as becoming
unemployed is like being reborn as a labour market entrant in the model presented here.  In
addition the wage distribution among group II must be less than that among group I.  If the
proportion of workers from the two groups did not vary with experience then the fact that the wage
distribution of the first group increases with experience and the wage distribution of the second
group is independent of experience would mean that the distribution of the mixture of the two must
be increasing with age. The source of the ambiguity in the impact of experience on wages
described in Proposition 3 is that the proportion of workers from the two groups does change and
not in a way that is necessarily monotonic in age.
As we vary experience, the job-to-job mobility rate falls which tends to increase the
proportion of new recruits from group II and the unemployment rate falls which tends to reduce
the proportion from group I.  To consider a specific example, suppose that the unemployment rate
is one for labour market entrants so that for very young workers we know that the bulk of recruits
must have come from unemployment so that the proportion from group II initially falls with
experience.  But, there comes a point at which the proportion of new recruits from group II may
start to rise again because the job-to-job mobility rate falls faster with experience than the
unemployment rate.  Intuitively when we observe an old worker with low job tenure it is quite
unlikely that they arrived in this new job because they got a better job offer and relatively likely
that they arrived in the new job after an intervening period of unemployment.  This may mean that,
conditional on tenure, average wages are declining in experience over some range.   
What we have done so far is to consider the distribution of wages conditional on job tenure
and starting experience: however, most empirical applications focus on wages conditional on job
tenure and current experience.  Obviously the current experience effect is simply the starting8 The problem here is not that one cannot infer the transition rates of a continuous time process from
discrete observations when those transition rates are constant, but that this becomes exceedingly difficult
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experience effect but the job tenure effect is the job tenure effect of Proposition 2 minus the starting
experience effect.  One might think, given Proposition 3, that it is very difficult to say anything
about this effect but a very simple result can be derived for the case where transition rates are
constant.
Proposition 5: If transition rates are constant, then the wage distribution is increasing (decreasing)
in job tenure as:
Proof: See Appendix.
One can use Proposition 5 in a number of ways.  First, one can ask the question “when does an
earnings function give an unbiassed estimate of the returns to tenure?”.  In this case the ‘true’
returns to tenure are zero and by inspection of (11) one can see that this condition is satisfied in
a number of cases.  First, if du=0 (so that no workers ever enter unemployment) and either        u(a-
t)=0 at all ages or ?e=?u.  These conditions are obviously rather restrictive.  But the effect of tenure
on expected wages can be positive or negative.  As in the case of age there are two effects working
in the opposite direction.  On the one hand high job tenure means that the current job started at a
young age and hence is likely to have been a low wage job.  On the other hand, the fact that the job
has lasted a long time means that no better job offer has been received and this makes it likely to
be a mighty good thing.  There are some unambiguous predictions.  As u(a) tends to du/(du+?u) as
a goes to infinity, the left-hand side of (11) is then automatically positive meaning that expected
wages should be increasing in job tenure for the oldest age groups (though the experience level at
which this result is relevant could conceivably be infeasible).  
If ?e=?u, on-the-job search is as effective as off-the-job search so that expected wages are
related only to total time spent in the labour market since last leaving unemployment.  A long job
tenure is an indication that the worker has been in employment for a long time so that the tenure
effect is positive if the job destruction rate is positive.  But, if it is zero, expected wages will be
unrelated to tenure.  This is a point emphasized in Topel (1991), though given the actual
configuration of transition rates in our data, he gives this example somewhat more weight than
might be warranted.  
This section has examined the predictions of a simple search model for the relationship
between the wage distribution, experience and tenure.  It has attempted to provide some insight
into the general results that can be derived.  But, from the practical point of view it is (7) that is
most useful as it shows how one can use information on transition rates (which are observable)
to derive predictions about the distribution of workers given experience and job tenure.  How well
these predictions coincide with the reality is the subject of the rest of this paper.
2. Estimation Strategy
While it is convenient in a theoretical model to work in continuous time, this becomes
computationally infeasible when one tries to make the model operational.8 So, let us brieflywhen, as here, transition rates are potentially non-constant.     
9
G(F*a) ’ s(a)[1&?e(a)(1&F)]G(F*a&1) % [1&s(a)]F (12)
R(F,a&t) ’ [1&du(a&t)]?e(a&t)[1&u(a&t&1)]G(F*a&t&1) % [1&s(a&t)][1&u(a&t)] (13)
[1&u(a&t)] ’ [1&du(a&t)][1&u(a&t&1)] % [1&s(a&t)][1&u(a&t)] (14)
R(F,a&t) ’ [1&u(a&t)] ?e(a&t)s(a&t)G(F*a&t&1) % [1&s(a&t)] (15)
describe a discrete time version of the model.  Suppose, for the moment, that the unit of time is so
short that no more than one job offer is received within it (the appropriateness of this assumption
is an issue which we address further below).  Denote by G(F*a) the fraction of workers at position
F or below in the wage offer distribution of experience a.  Those in employment at experience a
can be divided into two groups: those who have been in continuous employment in the last period
and those who have had some period of non-employment.  Denote by s(a) the proportion who have
had continuous employment.  Of these G(F*a-1) will have been employed at a position lower than
F in the previous period of whom ?e (a) will have received another job offer (this should now be
interpreted as a probability) and, of these a fraction (1-F) will have left.  For those entrants from
non-employment a fraction F will be at F or below.  This means that we must have:
Given the initial condition G(F*0)=F, this can be solved given data on s(a) and ?e(a).  Now
consider how the distribution of F conditional on experience and tenure can be derived.  Let us
denote by du(a) the probability of a worker employed a period ago having lost their job and,
conditional on not having lost their job, let ?e(a) be their probability of having received another
job offer.  Consider the number of workers with experience a and tenure t who are at position F
in the wage offer distribution.  We know two things about these workers:
C they must have been recruited to position F at experience (a-t)
C they have not lost their job nor received a better offer since
Denote by R(F,a-t) the flow of recruits to position F at experience (a-t).  We must have:
The first term is those workers in employment at (a-t-1) who did not lose their job, received a
wage offer of F and wanted that job (i.e. were previously employed at a job of position less than
F).  The second group is the recruits from unemployment which, from our earlier definition we
know must be equal to (1-s)(1-u).  One can simplify this formula by noting that:
Substituting this into (13) we have that:
Given this the density of those at position F of experience a with job tenure t is given by:10
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Given this the density of F given (a,t) is worked out according to the formula in (7).  We have now
shown how knowledge of  [s(a),du(a),?e(a)] is sufficient to work out the distribution of workers
across the wage offer distribution conditional on experience and job tenure.  But we need to
convert the wage offer distribution to actual wages.  Let us consider how we can do this.  Suppose
we are interested in the average wage conditional on experience and tenure.  We can write this as:
The two terms in the second line can be given the following interpretation.  The first is the average
wage of someone with experience a and tenure t if there were no ‘true’ returns to experience or
tenure and the wage paid to an older workers at a given point in the wage offer distribution is
exactly the same as that paid to a labour market entrant.  This term is a natural measure of the
contribution of the search process to the profile.  This term can be computed given knowledge of
G(F*a,t) and w(F,0) which can be estimated from the observed wage distribution for labour market
entrants as G(F*0,0)=F by definition.  The second term in the second line of (17) can be
interpreted as the ‘true’ returns to experience.  If w(F,a)=w(F)+f (a) then this term is simply equal
to f (a)-f (0) which is the unambiguous measure of the ‘true’ return to experience in this case. 
3. The Data
The data we use in this study comes from the UK Labour Force Survey for the period March 1993
to February 1996.  This corresponds to the entire available period for which the LFS has wage
information.  In this period individuals were in the LFS for five quarters but were only asked about
their wage in the final quarter.  However, in the four previous quarters they were asked about their
labour market status and, if in work, on their job tenure.  This is supplemented by information on
their age and the age they left full-time education to compute potential years of labour market
experience. Most of our analysis is based on the sample of individuals for whom five quarters of
information are available.  This raises issues of attrition bias: the LFS is an address-based survey
so that individuals who change address are deliberately not followed and are replaced in the
sample by any who move into the address.  As moving address is often associated with labour
market transitions (we can see this by looking at the movers-in) this causes potential bias in our
estimates of transition rates.  One way of assessing the extent of this problem is to compare our
estimates of transition rates from the LFS from those derived from the British Household Panel
Study (BHPS) which does not suffer from this problem.  The BHPS is also useful in overcoming
another limitation of the LFS, namely that we have only 5 discrete observations on the labour
market state which will cause us to miss very short labour market states which happen to fall
between two observation points.   The BHPS collects retrospective information on labour market11
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activity over the previous year which, in theory, can be used to pick up all spells however short
(see Paull, 1996, for a discussion of the evidence on the reliability of this information). 
The unit of time that we used for the analysis is a year.  The trade-off in deciding on the
unit of time is the following.  Using a long period increases the cell sizes and hence the precision
of the estimates of transition rates and average wages, but increases the proportion of the
population which will have received more than one job offer in the period (which is the
assumption on which the formulae (12)-(16) are based).  Below we argue that, for our data, this
latter problem is unlikely to be very serious, so a year seems to be a reasonable period for
analysis.  Accordingly we assign to each individual in their fifth quarter a level of experience
equal to the years of labour market experience completed (ie it is an integer value) and, in the case
of those in work, a level of job tenure equal to the years of tenure completed in the firm.  Of the
93810 individuals for whom we had wage information, we had to discard 1.6 per cent of the
observations who had reported tenure greater than experience or tenure missing altogether.
Figure 1 shows the non-employment rates by experience and sex.  The data from the LFS
and BHPS correspond very closely and show the pattern we would expect with a u-shaped
relationship between non-employment rates and experience for men and a similar relationship with
the addition of a ‘bump’ for women associated with time taken out of the labour market primarily
to care for children.
The theory suggests that the fraction of labour market entrants is important in the
relationship between wages and experience.  Figure 2 plots [1-s(a)] for our data.  For the LFS,
labour market entrants are defined as those workers who have recorded any period of non-
employment in the first four quarters of their presence in the panel.  This obviously does not
include those who had a job at one interview, lost it and found another by the next interview so
should lead to an under-estimate of the actual numbers.  The BHPS figures should allow for this
as a labour market entrant is defined as someone with less than 99% of their time in employment
over the previous year.  The numbers for the BHPS and LFS are very similar, suggesting that any
bias in the LFS is rather small.  For men the proportion of entrants is a decreasing convex function
of experience.  For women the proportion of entrants is slightly higher on average but the picture
is similar, with the addition of a noticeable ‘bump’ when women return to the labour market after
having children.
Now consider the rate at which workers change jobs.  For those workers who have been
in continuous employment we compute the fraction who have changed jobs in the previous year
which we determine by whether current reported tenure is less than a year.  Figure 3 presents the
estimates of the job-changing rates from the LFS and BHPS.  For both men and women the picture
is very similar with the job-changing rate being a declining convex function of experience.  Of
course, this only gives the fraction of job offers received that are accepted (which we will denote
by ?(a), not the job offer arrival rate that the theory requires, but we can establish the relationship
between the two according to the formula:
Now let us consider the extra information needed to work out (17).  For this we need the job loss
rates.  This is given by the fraction of those in employment at the first interview who have had any
subsequent recorded period of non-employment.  Figure 4 presents the relevant information.  This12
is the one place where the LFS and BHPS seem to give rather different results, with job
destruction rates being much higher in the LFS than the BHPS and the BHPS showing none of the
marked rise in job destruction rates for older workers that is apparent in the LFS.  One possible
explanation for the discrepancy is that labour market transitions tend to ‘disappear’ in
retrospective surveys which is how the BHPS information is collected (see Paull, 1996).
Before we proceed we need to discuss the assumption that a year is a period sufficiently
short for at most one job offer to be received.  We can obtain information on the adequacy of this
assumption from both the LFS and BHPS.  There are two groups of workers who we might worry
about here.  First,  those in continuous employment who we assume have had at most one job
change but might have had more.  We can work out the number of different jobs held by these
individuals in the BHPS and LFS.  This information is tabulated in Table 1a.   For those who have
had at least one change (itself a small fraction of those in continuous employment) only 10 per cent
have had more than one change.  
The other group are the entrants into employment from non-employment who we have
assumed to have had at most one job since non-employment but might have had more than one.  The
relevant fact here is the number of jobs held since the last spell of non-employment.  This is
tabulated in Table 1b.  Again, only something like 10 per cent of employment entrants have had
more than one job since entering employment.  Given the information in Tables 1a and 1b, we will
proceed on the basis that it is reasonable to assume that at most one wage offer has been received
in the course of a year.
Wages are computed as average hourly earnings in the main job.  We converted all wages
to a common date by taking out time means.
Now consider how we can compute the predictions of the pure search model.  We use the
fact that for labour market entrants G(F*0)=F so that w(F,0)=w(G,0) for these workers ie we can
estimate the wage offer distribution by the actual distribution of wages among labour market
entrants.  We also compute G(F*a) and g(F*a,t) using the recursive formulae in (12) and (16), the
formula in (7) and our estimates of the transition rates.  There is a steady-state assumption being
made in this, namely that in estimating the transition rates that someone with a=40 had 20 years ago
we can use the transition rates of someone with a=20 today rather than 20 years ago.  This is likely
to be dangerous if there are important cohort effects or aggregate effects eg because of the business
cycle.  There is one important way in which the study period is unusual, namely that the 1990s
were a period when the transition rates of men and women seem to have almost converged (as we
have seen in Figures 2 and 4).  This is for two reasons: the increasing labour market attachment
of women and the increased risk of job loss for men (unemployment rates for men are now
substantially above those for women). As Manning (1996) shows this was not true in earlier
periods.  The consequence of this is that the model predicts more similar profiles for men and
women than one would probably predict if one used more historical data.  One way of thinking
about this problem is that older women in our sample are assumed to have had the same level of
labour market attachment in their youth as young women do today, when their actual attachment
was much less.  This problem should be borne in mind in what follows.
4. Results
4.1 The Relationship Between Wages and Experience
Although it is not the main focus of the paper, we will start by looking at the relationship between
wages and experience when we do not control for job tenure.  Figure 5 presents the actual and13
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predicted profile for men and women.  Both profiles are normalized so that the earnings of labour
market entrants are zero.  The search model predicts the concavity of the profile though the
predicted profile for women has a ‘bump’ caused by withdrawal from employment for domestic
reasons which no longer exists in the actual profile (though interestingly Manning, 1996, shows
that it used to).  
In the simple model where w(F,a)=w(F)+f (a) and there are no effects of job tenure, the
gap between the actual and predicted profiles can be interpreted as the ‘true’ returns to experience
after removing the search effects.  But this interpretation is only valid if there are no ‘true’ effects
of tenure, so let us turn to this issue.
4.2 The Relationship Between Wages, Experience and Tenure
Figure 6 presents the average wage profiles for men and women for given experience and tenure
levels, focusing on the returns to tenure.  These profiles are normalized on the average wages of
labour market entrants being zero which makes it rather hard to separate the returns to tenure from
the returns to experience.  To make this job somewhat easier Figure 7 normalises on the average
wage of someone of zero tenure being zero for each experience level.  As one can see the returns
to tenure of men and women are very similar; they seem always to be positive and they seem to
be lower at higher levels of experience.
Now consider how well the search model can explain the returns to tenure.  Figures 6 and
7 also present this information.  As can be seen the parameters of the search model also predicts
a return to tenure that is everywhere positive, and it is of a very similar order of magnitude to the
actual observed.  Quite how similar is hard to tell from the graphs so Table 2 presents some
simple regressions to summarize the data.   
The ‘observations’ used in these regressions are a particular sex-experience-tenure
combination.  In the regressions that follow we weight by the relevant cell size (one might also
want to adjust for differences in variances but this is not straightforward when we work with the
predicted profiles).  In the first column we present a simple regression of the actual mean log wage
on a full set of experience dummies and a cubic tenure term.  The second column performs a
similar regression for the predicted mean log wage.  As can be seen the predicted tenure effect is
a similar order of magnitude.  In the third column we simply take the difference between the actual
and the predicted.  This residual is correlated with the tenure terms, implying that the search model
cannot explain all the observed returns to tenure.  However, the gap between the actual and
predicted is quite small and not always in one direction so that the search model does appear to
do quite a good job in explaining these returns.  One can also see that the experience  dummies are
very significant because of the fact seen earlier that the search model seriously under-predicts
returns to experience.  But, if the wage offer function is of the form w(F,a)=w(F)+f (a) then one
should be able to fully explain these experience dummies using the gap between the actual and
predicted profile conditional just on experience.  To see this note that in this case we have:9 Reference should be made here to Mortensen (1988) who compared the job turnover predictions of a
search model of the Jovanovic (1979a, 1979b, 1984) type and a model of specific human capital.
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The term in square brackets on the second line is the gap between the actual and predicted profile
conditional on experience alone and is our estimate of the ‘true’ experience effect.  This can be
estimated using our earlier results that were reported graphically in Figure 5.  The second F-
statistic in the third column shows that one can accept the hypothesis that there is no extra
experience effect once one has taken out this estimate of the ‘true’ experience effect.
These results suggest that the data is broadly consistent with a model in which
w(F,a)=w(F)+f (a) and there are no ‘true’ returns to tenure.  Let us now consider whether there
is any other evidence consistent with this view.
4.3 The Variance Profile
If it is the case that w(F,a)=w(F)+f (a) then it should be the case that the actual and predicted
variances should coincide as the additively separable experience term will add nothing to the
variance.  Tables 8a and 8b  show the actual and predicted variance profiles for men and women
respectively.  The actual and predicted must, by construction, coincide for zero experience and
tenure.  As can be seen, the actual and predicted variances are in the right ball-park, though the
actual profile shows a very marked decline in the early years of job tenure, while the predicted
declines only more gradually. 
4.4 The Distribution of Job Tenure
The model we have presented also has implications for the distribution of job tenure among
workers given experience.9  Recall that the function n(F,a,t) gave us the density of workers at
position F with experience a and t.  From this function one can derive the distribution function of
tenure given experience J(t*a) by the following formula:
which can be computed given the search model.  Figures 9a and 9b present the predicted and
actual cumulative tenure distributions for men and women respectively.  To the naked eye they
coincide, suggesting that the model does a good job in predicting the distribution of job tenure in
the population.  The ability of the simple search model to predict the distribution of tenure can also
be thought of as a test of certain simplifying assumptions of our model e.g. the assumption that job
offers arrive at the same rate at all points in the wage distribution so that these results are
confirmation that our simple model does not seem to be grossly at variance with the facts.  15
5. Tenure Profiles by Education
What we have done so far is to group all education groups together.  But it might be the case that
there are important differences across education groups.  In terms of their experience profiles,
Manning (1996) showed that the profiles for those who left full-time education at an earlier age
have very steep growth for the initial years but then flatten out very quickly.  More educated
workers have growth at a more gradual pace over more years but the maximum return to
experience is less than for the less-educated.  This pattern is repeated in the data used here as
Figure 10a shows (group 1 are those who left school with no qualifications, group 2 those who left
at 16 with some qualifications, group 3 those who left at 18 and group 4 those who left at age 21
or above).  But what about the tenure profile?  There is a lot of information to summarize here and
a simple way of doing this is shown in Tables 3a and 3b where we use the approach of Table 2
to provide parametric estimates of the returns to tenure.  As can be seen there are no very marked
differences across education groups in the returns to tenure and the actual returns are tracked pretty
well by the predicted returns.  For 7 out of the 8 sex-education combinations one can accept the
hypothesis that the residual returns to experience conditional on experience and tenure can be fully
explained by the residual returns conditional on experience alone.
6. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the predictions of a simple search model for the returns to
tenure and experience.  We have shown how information on labour market transition rates and  the
wage distribution of labour market entrants can be used to quantify the relationship between
wages, experience and tenure predicted by the search model.  We then applied these results to
British data.  While we found that the search model can explain part of the returns to experience,
we also a found a substantial part that could not be explained by the model, and so should be
interpreted as the ‘true’ returns to tenure.  In contrast we showed how the search model can explain
the bulk of the returns to tenure without need for any true effects of tenure on wages.  One should
remember that our results are based on the assumption that there are no such ‘true’ returns and that
our equations would need modification if there were such returns.  However, it  would appear that
understanding the process of search and job mobility does have the potential to explain a
considerable part of earnings functions, and so should perhaps receive more attention than it
commonly does.  
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  Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
To work out the effect on G of x, differentiate (7) with respect to x (it is actually more convenient
to differentiate ln(G)):
We can sign this unambiguously if the partial derivative of ln(n) with respect to x is monotonic in
F.  If it is increasing in F, then ln(G) is decreasing in x which implies first-order stochastic
dominance.
Proof of Proposition 3
If ?e=?u/?, then if we define J(F,a)=u(a)+N(F,a), combining (1) and (2), we must have:
which has as a solution:17
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From (6) we know that the starting experience effect works only through ?J so that the test of
Proposition 1 can be applied just to ln(J).  We have:
which implies that:
so that the test of Proposition 1 depends on whether:
The simplest way to show the sign of this is ambiguous is to evaluate at a=0.  Then
J(F,a)=J(F,0)=[u(0)+F(1-u(0))] and (26) becomes:
which is clearly always positive for u(0) close enough to zero and negative for u(0) close enough
to one.  For u(0) at its steady-state value we have:18
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the sign of which depends on F.
  As we do not have first-order stochastic dominance appropriate choice of the wage
function w(F,a) can make average wages decreasing (or increasing) in labour market experience.
Proof of Proposition 5
By taking the logs of (5) and (6) and differentiating with respect to t we have that:
Now, using (1) and (2) we can write this as:
As N is increasing in F (by definition) the application of the rule of Proposition 1 gives (11).19
Table 1a
Number of Job Changes For Those in Continuous Employment Who Have Changed Jobs
LFS BHPS
No. of Job Changes Proportion  Sample Size Proportion Sample Size
1 90.1 5456 89.3 1334
2 9.0 546 9.0 134
3 0.8 48 1.5 23
4 0.0 2 0.1 1
5 0.0 0 0.0 0
6 0.0 0 0.1 1
 
Table 1b
Number of Job Changes Since Labour Market Entry for Labour Market Entrants
LFS BHPS
No. of Job Changes Proportion  Sample Size Proportion Sample Size
0 91.1 10320 90.8 1608
1 8.3 936 8.0 142
2 0.6 70 1.0  18
3 0.0 5 0.1 320
Table 2
Estimates of the Returns to Tenure
dependent variable sex tenure/1
0
(tenure/10)
2 (tenure/10)
3 R
2 Number
of  cells
F-test for
experience effects
actual mean log wage men 0.417
(0.026)
-0.157
(0.018)
0.023
(0.003)
0.91 1079 353.5
predicted mean log wage men 0.348
(0.009)
-0.060
(0.006)
0.005
(0.001)
0.98 1079 169.2
residual mean log wage men 0.069
(0.025)
-0.097
(0.017)
0.017
(0.003)
0.78 1079 198.47
0.28
*
actual mean log wage women 0.452
(0.023)
-0.154
(0.019)
0.022
(0.004)
0.85 1033 202.9
predicted mean log wage women 0.408
(0.015)
-0.102
(0.011)
0.012
(0.002)
0.95 1033 106.3
residual mean log wage women 0.044
(0.020)
-0.052
(0.017)
0.009
(0.003)
0.63 1033 99.3
1.00
*
Notes: 1. All regressions are weighted using cell sizes: standard errors are heteroscedastic-consistent.
2. Numbers of observations differ because there are some cells with missing information.
3. All regressions include a full set of experience dummies. The F-test in the final column is a test of the
hypothesis that the coefficients on these dummies are all zero.  Degrees of freedom are 45 and the number
of observations minus 49.  The test statistics marked with an asterisk are tests of the hypothesis that the
experience effects can be fully explained by  the ‘true’ experience profile as estimated from the difference
between the actual and predicted wage-experience profile (ie not controlling for tenure).   21
Table 3a
Estimates of the Returns to Tenure by Education: Men
dependent variable education tenure/1
0
(tenure/10)
2 (tenure/10)
3 R
2 Number
of cells
F-test for
experience
effects
actual mean log wage 1 0.330
(0.038)
-0.154
(0.026)
0.025
(0.005)
0.65 987 73.1
predicted mean log wage 1 0.160
(0.009)
-0.022
(0.006)
0.002
(0.001)
0.94 987 9479.3
residual mean log wage 1 0.170
(0.038)
-0.131
(0.026)
0.024
(0.004)
0.43 987 37.8
1.19
*
actual mean log wage 2 0.336
(0.028)
-0.114
(0.020)
0.015
(0.004)
0.75 1049 125.8
predicted mean log wage 2 0.181
(0.005)
-0.031
(0.003)
0.003
(0.001)
0.98 1049 278.6
residual mean log wage 2 0.154
(0.027)
-0.082
(0.020)
0.013
(0.004)
0.59 1049 98.5
3.16
*
actual mean log wage 3 0.418
(0.036)
-0.140
(0.026)
0.019
(0.005)
0.89 1026 208.4
predicted mean log wage 3 0.354
(0.013)
-0.077
(0.008)
0.008
(0.001)
0.96 1026 61.1
residual mean log wage 3 0.063
(0.038)
-0.062
(0.027)
0.011
(0.005)
0.77 1026 128.0
0.64
*
actual mean log wage 4 0.395
(0.039)
-0.141
(0.027)
0.018
(0.005)
0.73 1026 211.7
predicted mean log wage 4 0.223
(0.019)
-0.042
(0.012)
0.007
(0.002)
0.82 1026 32.3
residual mean log wage 4 0.172
(0.046)
-0.099
(0.031)
0.010
(0.006)
0.56 1026 106.9
1.50
*
Note: As For Table 2.22
Table 3b
Estimates of the Returns to Tenure by Education: Women
dependent variable education tenure/1
0
(tenure/10)
2 (tenure/10)
3 R
2 Number
of cells
F-test for
experience
effects
actual mean log wage 1 0.410
(0.033)
-0.168
(0.028)
0.023
(0.006)
0.63 904 63.2
predicted mean log wage 1 0.237
(0.009)
-0.051
(0.006)
0.006
(0.001)
0.96 904 204.1
residual mean log wage 1 0.172
(0.035)
-0.118
(0.029)
0.017
(0.007)
0.38 904 21.5
0.94
*
actual mean log wage 2 0.429
(0.042)
-0.134
(0.036)
0.014
(0.007)
0.65 797 40.1
predicted mean log wage 2 0.317
(0.016)
-0.071
(0.012)
0.008
(0.002)
0.93 797 96.9
residual mean log wage 2 0.113
(0.041)
-0.063
(0.035)
0.007
(0.007)
0.38 797 19.1
1.44
*
actual mean log wage 3 0.397
(0.024)
-0.130
(0.020)
0.017
(0.004)
0.81 972 269.3
predicted mean log wage 3 0.411
(0.015)
-0.113
(0.011)
0.014
(0.002)
0.94 972 86.4
residual mean log wage 3 -0.014
(0.023)
-0.016
(0.019)
0.002
(0.004)
0.66 972 186.6
0.48
*
actual mean log wage 4 0.234
(0.031)
-0.074
(0.027)
0.011
(0.006)
0.53 937 282.4
predicted mean log wage 4 0.245
(0.012)
-0.033
(0.008)
0.005
(0.001)
0.92 937 50.7
residual mean log wage 4 -0.015
(0.032)
-0.041
(0.027)
0.006
(0.006)
0.35 937 211.1
0.70
*
Note: As for Table 2.23
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